definitely a good, quick read...it's cool to see that other gamers are also
interested in the business/partner****p/manufacturing end of games and not
just the final product. allot of the behind the scenes stuff with
consoles
and some of the bigger games is actually pretty amazing, same as it for
computers....like that mouse that you're probably using to negotiate
around
your computer, and the windows that open for each new program you start or
page you transition from.......originally developed by xerox, a
photocopier
company....then quickly stolen by apple, then promptly stolen from them by
microsoft, who marketed it, sold it and ended up making the digital world
nearly come to their knees.....that's awesome.
also, did you know that Halo was oringinally a game developed by
atari.....who later sold it to bungie because the beta testers they
employed
for the games initial build didn't like the fact that it was a fi****ng
game
who's protagonist was a green, steel clad army guy named Master
Baiter......yeah.....i know what your thinking, but that's how i heard it
went down
Xenon" <xenonxbox2@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote in message
news:SJidnfwpu-GGPwPcRVn-sA@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [originally from the defunct Next Generation Online website, circa 1998.
> deals with Nintendo, 3DO, 3DO's remnants, and Microsoft]
>
> extremely interesting IMO.
>
>
____________________________________________________________________________
> _______________________
> "Although experts acknowledge that the video games business is
surprisingly
> *****uous by even Jerry Springer's standards, recent developments
taking
> place within two of Seattle's biggest cor****ations have made that fact
clear
> for the whole world to see. Next Generation Online exclusively re****ts
on
> how Nintendo and Microsoft wound up eyeing the same company's chipset
for
> the year 2000's biggest game console.
> Few in the video game industry are aware of a rift that formed between
> Nintendo and partner Silicon Graphics, Inc. just as their
jointly-developed
> 64-bit game console rolled off production lines. Already beginning to
feel
> financial strains due to changing market conditions for their high-end
> graphics workstations, Silicon Graphics found itself arguing over
component
> profits with notoriously tight-fisted Nintendo as the system's American
> launch MSRP was lowered at the last minute before release. Although the
> companies maintained their working relation****p, the decidedly
traditional
> and hard- lined management at Nintendo had taken offense, and no longer
> considered SGI a lock for development of Nintendo's post-N64 game
console.
>
> Then several im****tant events took place during 1997 inside of Nintendo,
SGI
> and one of their former competitors. Weak Japanese sales of the N64 and
its
> software lowered the company's confidence in the N64 platform, and
American
> sales were projected to fall off as key internal software titles were
> continuing to miss release targets by entire seasons. Demonstrably
strong
> sales of PlayStation games in the inexpensive CD format had weakened the
> appeal of Nintendo's third-party development contracts, and Nintendo
started
> to believe that it was in the company's immediate interest to prepare a
new
> console for release as soon as Fall of 1999. At the same time, a number
of
> Silicon Graphics key Nintendo 64 engineers left the company to form the
new
> firm ArtX, with the express intention to win a development contract for
> Nintendo's next hardware by offering Nintendo the same talent pool sans
> SGI's manufacturing and management teams.
>
> As it turns out, most of the industry's top 3D chip experts have been
lured
> away from smaller firms by accelerator developers NVidia, 3Dfx and NEC,
so
> Nintendo's pool of potential partners was already shrinking when it
began
to
> shop around for a new console design team. Enter CagEnt, a division of
> consumer electronics manufacturer Samsung, and here's where the
confusion
> begins: CagEnt was formerly owned by 3DO, where it operated under the
name
> 3DO Systems and developed the M2 technology that was sold to Panasonic
for
> $100 Million some time ago. When 3DO decided to exit the hardware
business,
> it sold off the 3DO Systems division to Samsung, which named it CagEnt
and
> gave it roughly two years to turn a profit. CagEnt owned three key
> technologies: a DVD playback system, a realtime MPEG encoding system
called
> MPEG Xpress, and a completed game console with a brand new set of
> console-ready chip designs called the MX. Adrian Sfarti, who had
formerly
> developed the graphics architecture design for SGI's Indy workstation,
was
> the head of the MX project.
>
> The MX chipset was a dramatically enhanced version of the M2 chipset
sold
to
> Panasonic and Matsu****a, now capable of a 100 million pixel per second
> fillrate and utilizing two PowerPC 602 chips at its core. (CagEnt's
> executives also boasted of a four million triangle per second peak draw
> rate, though the quality of those tiny triangles would of course have
been
> limited). Nintendo executives Howard Lincoln and Genyo Takeda were among
a
> group of visiting dignitaries to tour CagEnt's facilities, culminating
in
> late 1997 or early 1998 with a formal offer from Nintendo to acquire
CagEnt
> outright. At this point, Nintendo had terminated its development
contract
> with SGI (see SGI/MIPS Loses Nintendo Business).
>
> As purchase negotiations continued, Nintendo worked with CagEnt
engineers
on
> preliminary plans to redesign the MX architecture around a MIPS CPU, as
> Nintendo's manufacturing partner NEC has a MIPS development license but
none
> to produce the PowerPC 602. Nintendo and CagEnt flip-flopped on whether
the
> finished machine would include a built-in CD-ROM or DVD-ROM as its
primary
> storage medium, with Nintendo apparently continuing to insist that ROM
> cartridges would remain at the core of its new game system. Yet as DVD
and
> MPEG technologies would have been part of the CagEnt acquisition,
Nintendo
> would probably have found some reasonable use for those patents
eventually.
> The MX-based machine was to be ready for sale in Japan in fall 1999 --
in
> other words, development of games for the new console would begin within
> literally months, starting with the ****pment of dev kits to key teams at
> Rare and Nintendo's Japanese headquarters.
>
> Although the asking price for CagEnt was extremely low by industry
> standards, talks unexpectedly broke off in early 1998 when Samsung and
> Nintendo apparently disagreed on final terms of CagEnt's owner****p,
leaving
> Samsung's management desperate for a suitor to buy the company. CagEnt
> aggressively shopped itself around to other major industry players.
SGI's
> MIPS division, reeling from the loss of its N64 engineers to ArtX,
allegedly
> considered acquiring CagEnt as a means to offer Nintendo the technology
it
> had already decided it liked. Sega, 3Dfx and other companies toured
CagEnt's
> facilities and finally CagEnt found a suitor.
>
> In early April, Microsoft's WebTV division ultimately acquired all of
the
> assets of CagEnt and hired on most of its key personnel. WebTV and
Microsoft
> apparently intend to use the MX technology at the core of their next
WebTV
> device, which as might be guessed from the graphics technology, will no
> longer be limited to simple web browsing and E-mailing functionality.
The
> next generation WebTV box will be Microsoft's low-cost entry into the
world
> of game consoles, melding the functionality of a low-end computer with a
> television set-top box and game-playing abilities. Having worked with
Sega
> behind the scenes since 1993 or 1994, Microsoft has been quietly
gathering
> the knowledge it needs to market and develop games for such a device,
and
> now it has the hardware that even Nintendo would once have wanted for
> itself.
>
> As for Nintendo, all signs point to a very unpleasant near future for
the
> Japanese giant. Lacking internal hardware engineers with the necessary
> expertise to develop the next high-end chipset, Nintendo is now all but
> forced to either partner with ArtX, or one of the 3D accelerator makers
who
> have been sucking the industry dry of all its most talented people, or
> perhaps join with one of its other major rivals. The latest word has it
that
> ArtX and Nintendo are in talks to work together, perhaps under
cir***stances
> similar to those under which Nintendo would have acquired CagEnt. Unlike
> CagEnt, however, ArtX does not have a finished console or even
> half-completed chip designs to sell Nintendo, and it would be unlikely
that
> Nintendo would be able to scrape together a reasonable system by
Christmas
> 2000 with ArtX's present limitations. Additionally, SGI's recent series
of
> strategic lawsuits against Nvidia and ArtX seem to be intended to serve
as
> garlic and crosses to stave off any Nintendo alliance with its tastiest
> potential allies: Nintendo might well fear developing a new console only
to
> find out that its core technologies or employees are depending upon
> infringed patents, regardless of the merits of those patents or the
> lawsuits.
>
> Meanwhile, the company continues to harbor tremendous concerns for the
> future of the Nintendo64 platform, which appears to be sinking deeper
and
> deeper in Japan by the day. Nintendo's negotiations with CagEnt shed
light
> upon the tremendous dependence the Japanese company now has upon Rare,
which
> has been responsible for a number of the Nintendo 64's best-looking
games
> and at least two of the machine's most popular -- Diddy Kong Racing and
> Goldeneye 007. As Nintendo's Japanese development teams have never been
> known for their ability to stick to release schedules, the company's
> third-party rosters have remained bare and its management has remained
> dogmatically fixated upon silicon chips as its sole means of profit,
> Nintendo's problems have set the stage for a truly interesting set of
> negotiations come this E3.
>
> To sum up, readers need to understand that decisions and relation****ps
made
> early in the design process of a new console can dictate a company's
> standing in the industry for the following five years. Ripple effects
from
> these decisions can be felt in a company's bottom line can be felt for
even
> longer. Nintendo has found itself in the unenviable position of being
> without an established partner and with the clock ticking down. If
Nintendo
> should choose to go with ArtX (assuming it's able to fight off SGI's
> lawsuit), it will need to complete a chip design is an extremely short
> period of time. If it doesn't go with ArtX, Nintendo will have to find a
> technology that is already suited to the console market or one that can
> readily be changed to suit a similar purpose. Either way, at this point
the
> chances of Nintendo hitting its desired 2000 release with a new system
are
> extremely slim."
>
>
____________________________________________________________________________
> ______________________
>
>
>
> the events described above that took place in 1997-1998 basicly shaped
this
> console cycle for Nintendo, as far as hardware goes.
>
>
|
