On May 6, 12:20=A0am, help bot <nomorech...@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
> On May 4, 3:33 pm, ttk5...@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
>
> > =A0 You then interpret this to mean "Es decir, Botvinnik controlaba
toda=
> > la informaci=F3n en el ajedrez ruso de la =E9poca y de forma
privilegiad=
a
> > seg=FAn sus intereses." (That is to say, Botvinnik controlled all
> > Russian chess information during this period in a privileged manner to
> > serve his own interests.)
> > =A0 This is undoubtedly true to some extent, but I do not think that
was=
> > the only meaning of Bronstein's statement. There was, I think, also
> > genuine admiration for and acknowledgement of Botvinnik's deep study
> > of the openings, which was accomplished to a great extent by hard
> > work, not just by controlling information.
>
> =A0 Is there any information on just how all this was
> supposedly accomplished? =A0I would imagine (but
> have no way of knowing) that controlling ALL such
> information was a daunting task, worthy of a small
> army of men; apparently, Mr. Botvinnik was a real
> "one-man army", in more ways than one.
I know for sure of two ways in which Botvinnik "controlled
information" about his opening repertoire, though neither could be
considered at all unethical. One, he simply did not play publicly for
long periods of time. For example, he did not play a single serious
public game between winning the world champion****p in 1948, and his
first defense of the title against Bronstein in 1951, nor between
losing the title to Smyslov in 1957 and reclaiming it in 1958. Two, he
would often have secret training matches, the games of which would not
be published.
Bronstein believes Botvinnik avoided playing in 1948-51 "because he
did not want to reveal his opening secrets to his challenger."
Perhaps, though Botvinnik simply says he was busy working on his
doctoral dissertation, and that rather than reaping any advantage from
the layoff, the lack of practice hurt him in the match (see
"Botvinnik's Best Games," vol 2, pp. 11-12).
Even allowing, for the sake of argument, Bronstein's interpretation
of 1948-51, I don't see anything unethical in this. However, what the
Spanish writers seem to be implying, or believe that Bronstein is
implying, is that Botvinnik used his position and connections to gain
preferential access to others' games, and perhaps limit publication of
his own games, or suppress Soviet publication of games Botvinnik
considered im****tant, e.g. TNs he might use from foreign games. I'm
sure the former is true, the latter I don't know.
Again, I would not consider the former course unethical, any more
than I'd consider it unethical for a wealthy American player to buy
more chess books and magazines than a player with little money could.
The latter kind of action runs counter to Western ideals of a free
press and free circulation of information, but wouldn't bother a
Soviet mind-set like Botvinnik's. Heck, probably wouldn't bother many
Western players, if they had the power. But whether Botvinnik actually
excercised that kind of control, I couldn't say.
> =A0 The one thing which all these Botvinnik-bashers
> cannot ever seem to do, is "fit" his powerful chess
> moves into their biased accounts in a way that
> makes any rational sense. =A0For instance, the
> dregs who maintain that all the other Soviet
> players were "ordered" to throw their games, fail
> to account for the fact that non-Soviets were also
> losing to him at the very same time. =A0When that
> sort of heavy bias creeps in, logic and reason go
> out the window.
There is no doubt that Botvinnik was a great player in his own
right. The question is whether he would have risen quite so high for
so long without state sup****t, preferential treatment, and unethical
behind-the-scenes dealings (e.g. pressure on Keres).
Here's a fairly relevant article by Edward Winter from 2003:
http://www.ches****story.com/winter/extra/pachman.html
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